Q69. Define "coordination" and give five examples of coordination problems that you dealt with today.
Q70. If social order equals coordination and cooperation, provide some illustrations that support the authors' contention that "the problem of social order underlies questions of central concern to sociologists in substantive areas as diverse as crime and deviance, social movements, organizations, politics, religion, international relations, and the family" (xiii.1). Use this an opportunity to show you can distinguish cooperation and coordination and in general "get" the course. Perhaps add a category or two of your own.
Q238.
Fehr and Gintis describe experiments using a "public goods game." In the regular game, players tended to free-ride more and more as the game progresses. These results suggest that the sociological idea that people do the right thing because they are socialized to care about others is naive. Most people do not act in a “pro-social” manner. They free-ride.
When punishment is permitted, players punish free-riders even at a cost. Public goods increase as free-riding drops. Results like this defy the economic idea of people as selfish maximizers. They also suggest that hierarchy (surveillance/punishment) need not be centralized.
In the light of these results and the rest of the course, how do you think individual internalization of social values/norms, hierarchy, decentralized market interaction, and groups combine to create social order?
Q333. Consider each of the actions listed in the left column of this table. Thinking like Max Weber, in the other columns of each row, give a short explanation of how the action could be oriented in each of four ways (instrumentally rational, value rational, affectual, traditional). In some cases, you might conclude that it is simply too far fetched for an action to be subject to a particular orientation; these can be noted with an "X."
Action |
Instrumentally Rational
zweckrational |
Value Rational
wertrational |
Affectual |
Traditional |
Greetings |
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Investing |
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Picking a major |
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Helping an elderly person |
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Clipping coupons |
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Setting the table |
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Exercising |
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Praying |
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Observing holy days |
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Doing a class assignment |
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Going to college |
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Respecting one's elders |
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Q351. Define cooperation and give five examples where you have seen it (or its absence) recently.
Q352. Explain what Hedstrom ("Dissecting the Social") meant when he said "differences in some social states or events are considered explained if the decomposition eliminates them" (13.8)?
Q353. In "Dissecting the Social," Hedstrom suggests that "a statistical analysis is a test of an explanation, not the explanation itself" (13.9). Explain this distinction.
Q354. In "Dissecting the Social," what does Hedstrom mean by "realism" (14.9)? How is does this compare to Durkheim's dictum to "treat social facts as things"?
Q361. In the public goods game described by Fehr and Gintis, explain why we impose a cost on the punishER for each punishment issued. What does willingness to impose a punishment despite a cost suggest about the actor who does so?
Q363. Demonstrate your understanding of Weber's typology of social action in the context of this course by explaining this diagram.
Q364. Thinking back to the Kanazawa article on evolutionary biology, use this diagram to talk about at least six different ideas from this course.
Q371. A storyboard is a technique for graphically organizing the telling of a story. Think about how you would explain Kanazawa's description of evolutionary biology and its connection to our thinking about the basis for social order. Imagine how you would represent the theory visually and how you would explain it textually.
Q372. Explain the difference between cooperation and coordination as we are using them in this course. Give examples to support your explanation.