Q127. Consider the singles bar scene. Develop a model along the lines of the market for lemons (Wikipedia), that would suggest that information asymmetries could possibly kill the scene. What institutional interventions prevent this from happening?.
Assume that we begin with a set fraction of the bar population being creepy. Some of the nice people will put up with this fraction, but some find it unsettling. The latter decide, over the next time period, to stay home. The creepy people are unperturbed. Now the ratio of creepy to nice goes up. Some of the people who were OK with how it was last time period find the new level of creepiness unpalatable and they decide to stay home next time. Once again, the ratio goes up and now still more nice people start to feel like there are just too many creepy people in the bar scene. If the creepy people continue to be undeterred, the scene spirals into nothingness and eventually there are no more nice people to be found in bars.
Institutional solution. We might institute an inspection program — allow nice people to get certified and then give them a signalling mechanism (good dating seal of approval?). Or, institute a custom whereby people had to somehow show their cards before a serious encounter occurred (maybe have trivia contests so you see who seems smart).